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Appellate Jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals
in Ohio
Prior to its amendment in 1944, Article IV, Section 6, of the
Ohio Constitution read: "The Courts of Appeals shall have original
jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition
and procedendo, and appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery
cases, and to review, affirm, modify, or reverse the judgments of the
Courts of Common Pleas, Superior Courts and other courts of rec-
ord within the district as may be provided by law. . ." As amended,
the constitution reads: "The Court of Appeals shall have original
jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition
and procedendo, and such jurisdiction as may be provided by law
to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final
orders of bbards, commissions, officers, or tribunals and courts of
record inferior to the Court of Appeals within the district. . All
laws now in force, not inconsistent herewith, shall continue in
force until amended or repealed;..."
To implement the amendment, the Judicial Council advised the
General Assembly that the amended Article IV, Section 6, was not
self-executing and that the General Assembly was vested with the
authority to designate the kinds of cases in which there could be a
trial de novo in the Courts of Appeals and to provide generally for
the jurisdiction of the Court.
The 96th General Assembly, however, did not enact a statute
establishing the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals and
a.number of the courts.decided that since the General Assembly had
not acted to define their jurisdiction, they no longer had appellate
jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases and therefore no right to
hear the case de novo. On December 18, 1946,'the Supreme Court
of Ohio had the jurisdictional question squarely presented in
Youngstown Municipal Ry. v. City of Youngstown.2 In that case an
action was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas by the Youngs-
town Municipal Railway Company to enjoin the city of Youngstown
from levying and collecting a local ordinance-imposed license tax
upon the operation of trackless trolleys on the public streets of
Youngstown. The Common Pleas Court rendered a decree in favor
of the defendants after finding the tax valid. The Youngstown Rail-
way Company then appealed to the Court of Appeals on questions
of law and fact, whereupon the court held that the 1944 Amendment
to Article IV, Section 6, terminated- the Courts of Appeals' appellate
jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases and that the appeal then
2Youngstown Municipal Ry. v. City of Youngstown, Ohio App. (un-
reported). Sicker v. Powers, 74 N.E.2d 638 (Ohio App. 1946).
2 147 Ohio St. 221, 70 N.E.2d 649 (1946).
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pending before the court as a chancery case should be dismissed.
An appeal was then prosecuted to the Ohio Supreme Court which
held that the Ohio Constitution as amended empowers the General
Assembly to establish the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, but until action be taken by the legislative body, the
appellate jurisdiction remains as it was before the constitutional
amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed
and the cause remanded for a trial de novo.
Ohio's courts exist by virtue of constitutional provision, but
their jurisdiction was, prior to 1912, established by the legislature.
The Ohio Constitution of 1802 established a Court of Common Pleas
and a Supreme Court. The provisions were to the effect that the
Supreme Court should have original and appellate jurisdiction
"both in common law and chancery, in such cases as shall be di-
rected by law."3
In 1851, the Ohio Constitution created the District Court and
that court was given "such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided
by law." Section 12 provided that "district courts, shall, in their
respective counties; be the successors of the present supreme
court."'4 In exercising the power thus given by Article IV, Section
6, of the constitution, the legislature on March 23, 1852 provided
that appeals from "final judgments in civil cases at law, decrees
in chancery" in the Common Pleas Courts and Superior Courts
should be made to the District Court."
By the Code of Civil procedure adopted in 1853, law and equity
were fused into a single system. Before the adoption of the Code,
issues of fact in equity cases were tried by the court, but upon the
fusion of law and equity in 1853, the following provision, which is
now Ohio General Code Section 11379, was adopted and provided:
"Issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only,
or specific real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury, unless
a jury trial be waived, or a reference be ordered as hereinafter pro-
vided." Prior to 1853"the trial of issues of fact in equity cases was,
of course, for the court and on appeal, a second trial was permitted
because of the absence of a jury trial. Judge Nichols in referring
to the principle of one trial and one review, stated in Wagner v.
'OIo CONST. Art. III, §§ 1, 2 (1802).
'Reference to the "present supreme court" relates to the two judges on
the circuit as distinguished from the Supreme Court in banc sitting in
Columbus. Webster v. State, 43 Ohio St. 696, 699, 4 N.E. 92, 94 (1885).
50 Ohio Laws 93.
151 Ohio Laws 57, § 263. See Wall v. Dayton Federation Co., 121 Ohio
St. 334, 168 N.E. 847 (1929); Chapman v. Lee, 45 Ohio St. 356, 13 N.E. 736
(1887); Lange v, Lange, 69 Ohio St. 346, 69 N.E. 611 (1904); Fisher v.
Bower, 79 Ohio St. 248, 87 N.E. 256 (1909); Gunsaullus v. Pettit, 40 Ohio St.
27, 17 N.E. 231 (1888). Contra: Swanson v. Ahworth, 168 Minn. 84, 209
N.W. 907 (1926).
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Armstrong: "This principle had its inception in the purpose of
limiting to one review cases which had been tried by juries, where
not only the trial judge, but twelve citizens of the state sitting as a
jury, had determined the rights of the parties. In cases where one
man sitting as a court of equity has determined the issues, it is
only substantial justice that a de novo hearing be had."7 In accord
with this principle on April 12, 1858, the Act of March 23, 1852 was
amended and appeals were permitted from the Court of Common
Pleas to the District Court from all final judgments, orders or de-
crees in civil actions in which the parties did not have the right to
demand a trial by jury." Under this procedure if -a right to a trial
by jury existed, a second trial of the facts in the appellate court
would not result even if the case were equitable in nature, for if
the right to the trial by jury existed, the right to appeal was barred
by the statute.
The practice followed for 110 years was abandoned on Septem-
ber 3, 1912 when the Courts of Appeals were created and Article IV,
Section 6, of the constitution was amended.9 The legislature, in at-
tempting to continue the same practice of avoiding a trial de novo
when the right to a jury trial existed, enacted Ohio General Code
Section 12224 on April 29, 1913.10 The code read: "In addition to the
cases and matters specially provided for, an appeal may be taken
to the court of appeals by a party or other person directly affected,
from a judgment or final order in -a civil action rendered by the
common pleas court, and of which it had original jurisdiction if the
right to demand a jury therein did not exist. . . ." In Wagner v.
Armstrong, supra, the court held that Ohio General Code Section
12224 was unconstitutional because it attempted to enlarge the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals which had been fixed
by the constitutional amendment.1 These self-executing provisions
'93 Ohio St. 443, 460, 113 N.E. 397, 401 (1916).
8 55 Ohio Laws 82. This section was amended in 65 Ohio Laws 211, but
was not changed materially inspfar as it related to appellate jurisdiction.
The constitution was amended on October 9, 1883 and the Circuit Court
succeeded the District Court with "such appellate jurisdiction as may be
provided by law." Such law was passed on February 7, 1885 by the General
Assembly as follows: "An appeal may be taken to the circuit court by a
party or other person directly affected, from a judgment or final order in
a civil action rendered by the common pleas court, and of which it had
original jurisdiction, if the right to demand a jury therein did not exist."
82 Ohio Laws 32 (Section 5226, Revised Statutes). (1896 7th ed.)
'See opening paragraph, this comment.
1 103 Ohio Laws 429.
'-Cf. Cincinnati Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St. 415, 11I N.E. 159 (1915).
Appellate procedure, however, was not fixed by the constitution and the
General Assembly enacted the Appellate Prmcedure Act effective January
1, 1936. 116 Ohio Laws 104; Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 140 Ohio St. 432, 45
N.E. 2d 209 (1942); Barnes v. Christy, 102 Ohio St. 160, '131 N.E. 352 (1921).
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in the constitution were the first in the history of the state of Ohio
relative to the subject of appellate jurisdiction. 1 2
After the 1912 amendment, Ohio General Code Section 11379, of
course, remained in effect so that if the relief sought was a judg-
ment for money only, a right to a jury trial existed. At the same
time, Article IV, Section 6, of the constitution allowed an appeal in
"chancery cases." According to the decision in the Youngstown
Municipal Railway case, supra, this appellate jurisdiction remained
intact, notwithstanding the 1944 constitutional amendment to
Article IV, Section 6, omitted the words "chancery cases." The law
today stands as before the 1944 amendment and upon examination
of that law, an anomaly may be found. This anomaly violates the
principle of one trial and one review expounded by Judge Nichols
in Wagner v. Armstrong. The anomaly is well stated in Ire-
land v. Cheney13 when Judge Williams comments that, "Many cases
formerly not appealable because they were actions for money only
and triable to a jury within the meaning of Sections 5130 and 5226,
Revised Statutes, are now appealable because they are chancery
cases." Therefore under the doctrine enunciated in the Youngstown
Municipal Railway case, a jury trial may be had if the action
is for money only and a retrial on appeal might also be had in the
same action if the case were a "chancery case," that is, one which
prior to 1853, would have fallen within the jurisdiction of equity.14
This may be illustrated by the Gunsaullus case,", in which the pri-
mary relief sought was a money judgment, but the case was of an
equitable nature and but for the bar of Section 5226, would have
been appealable. As Section 5226 no longer is in effect, it is now
possible to have cases in which a jury trial may be had in the
lower court and a trial de novo on appeal.' In Ireland v. Cheney,
supra, Judge Williams further illustrates this possibility in cases of
equitable subrogation and contribution.
Was this anomaly in the minds of the framers *f the amend-
ment in 1912 or of the Judicial Council who proposed the 1944
amendment? In an attempt to conform to the former practice, a
proposal was introduced in the 1912 constitutional debates for the
purpose of giving the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to try de novo
cases wherein the right to a jury trial did not existY This proposal
was tabled. 8 If this proposal had been adopted, the anomaly would
"1 OHio Jur., "Historical Introduction," Clarence B. Laylin, Esq.
"-129 Ohio St. 527, 196 N.E. 267 (1935).
'"Wagner v. Armstrong, supra, note 7.
"Gunsaullus v. Pettit, 46 Ohio St. 27, 17 N.E. 231 (1888).
'
8 Bayly, Motion for New Trial and Time for Appeal, 7 OHIo ST. L. J.
293, 303, n.25 (1941).
"Constitutional Convention of Ohio (1912), Proceedings and Debates,
Vol. II, p. 1147.
uII id. at 1157..
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never have arisen because an appeal could not have been effected
in cases where a right to a jury trial existed in the lower court. The
matter was brought up again during the convention and the lan-
guage found in the constitution as amended in 1912 was inserted.19
This language gave the right to an appeal in those cases termed
"chancery cases." The convention at the -time of the introduction
of this language was under the impression that the phrase "ap-
pellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases" limited 'the right
of appeal to chancery cases in which the right to a jury trial did
not exist below.20 The original proposal had been voted down evi-
dently because of a misapprehension as to its meaning. 21 If the
intent of the convention had been strictly followed, a trial de novo
would have existed only in those chancery cases in which there
had been no right to a jury trial below. Judge Nichols in Wagner v.
Armstrong seemingly did not follow the intent of the con-
vention as he concluded that appeals would be had in all "chancery
cases" even though a right to a trial by jury existed below. As a
result of Judge Nichols' holding, an anomalous situation could re-
sult, an appeal in a chancery case in which the right to a jury trial
existed below.2 2 The convention had the anomaly in mind but
failed adequately to provide against it.
To ascertain whether the sponsors of the 1944 amendment had
this anomaly in mind it is necessary to examine the "objective foot-
prints" left by the sponsors so that the "intent" of the amendment
may be discovered. "If the legislative intent has meaning for the
interpretive process it means not a collection of subjective wishes,
hopes and prejudices of individuals, but rather the objective foot-
prints left on the trail of legislative enactment. '23 Applying this
same principle to constitutional interpretation, we may turn to the
statement issued by the sponsors of the 1944 amendment in hopes
of finding an objective pattern indicating the purpose of the amend-
ment. The statement is not one of great clarity. It does state that.
confusion has arisen from the 1912 amendment conferring appellate
jurisdiction in chancery cases on the Courts of Appeals. This con-
fusion emanates from the attempted categorization of "chancery
cases." The statement indicates that the General Assembly will be
given power to designate the type of cases in which an appeal will
lie, and therefore the problem of categorization is left to the legis-
lature, not to the courts. It further states, "This amendment does
"H id. at 1827.
"II id. at 1829.
21Ibid.
'The irony of the situation is that such an interpretation violates the
principles stated at the close of the opinion and previously quoted herein.
'2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY C014STRUCTION § 4506,' (3rd ed., Horack,
1943).
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not eliminate the trial de novo. It places the procedure where it
was before the amendment of the constitution in 1912." Again, it
indicates, "The right to trial de novo in cases in which no right of
trial by jury exiited was an integral part of the jurisprudence of
Ohio for more than sixty years." At this point it would seem that
the sponsors were very much in favor of the appellate procedure
existing before 1912 which barred the anomalous right to appeal in
cases wherein the right to a jury existed, but it is difficult to see
from the statement that the sponsors had the elimination of the
anomaly objectively in mind in sponsoring the amendment. It is
also difficult to determine why the sponsors mentioned the elimina-
tion of the phrase "appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery
cases," if they did not believe that such elimination would have an
immediate legal consequence upon the amendment. Yet the state-
ment indicates that the trial de novo is not eliminated and pro-
cedure is the same as that existing prior to 1912. Just how the
amendment places procedure as it was before 1912 is also difficult
to determine. The footprint of the amendment's trail of enactment
is far from clear, insofar as elimination of the inconsistency is con-
cerned. There is a strong indication, however, that the amendment
was for the purpose of ridding the courts of the problem of classify-
ing and categorizing "chancery cases." This might well be of in-
valuable assistance in determining the courts' appellate jurisdiction
after the 1944 amendment, for if the purpose was to relieve the
courts of the task of categorizing "chancery cases" as well as giving
the legislature that -power, the courts' appellate jurisdiction in
"chancery cases" might well have been deemed at an end as of
the effective date of the amendment.
The interpretation of the 1944 amendment given in the Youngs-
town Municipal Railway case nevertheless allows such categori-
zation by the courts to continue, and if the sponsors of the 1944
amendment were of the opinion that categorization of "chancery
cases" created confusion, that confusion is still with us. So also are
the laws that will allow a trial de novo on appeal in chancery cases
when a jury trial by right may be had below. The Supreme Court
placed especial emphasis in the Youngstown Municipal Railway
case on the words "all laws now in force, not inconsistent
herewith, shall continue in force until amended or repealed." The
word "laws" was used in a generic sense and hence interpreted to
mean both statutory and constitutional law and extended to apply
to Section 6 of Article IV, the very section that was amended. No
authority was quoted for such an interpretation and it is somewhat
doubtful if any could be found. It might well have been argued
that Article IV, Section 6, prior to the amendment was inconsistent
with the amendment, inasmuch as appellate jurisdiction in the trial
of "chancery cases" was conferred upon the Court of Appeals be-
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fore the amendment and by the very language of the amendment,
the phrase '"ppellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases"
was omitted. This fact plus the desire of the sponsors to eliminate
confusion caused in the attempted categorization of "chancery
cases" by the courts might well have been a sufficient basis upon
which the appellate jurisdiction of -the Courts of Appeals could
have been deemed at an end until legislative action again conferred
appellate power upon the court. The inconsistency in -the law and
the confusion still reign notwithstanding the Youngstown Municipal
Railway case, although the case defined the courts' appellate
jurisdiction and interpreted the 1944 amendment as a grant of legis-
lative power whereby the confusion and inconsistency might be
eliminated. It may well be that the decision of the court was some-
what influenced by the desirability of the Court of Appeals' reten-
tion of jurisdiction, the absence of which would have also created
confusion.
Several bills have been formulated by the 97th General As-
sembly (1947-48). H.B. No. 205 and Sub. H.B. No. 205 both propose
to confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of Appeals to retry the facts
in enumerated cases, ten in number, in which an appeal on ques-
tions of law and fact may be had.24 This enumeration of cases as
evidenced by H.B. No. 205 and Sub. H.B. No. 205 is a method of
circumvention rather than a direct attack on the problem, for such
a categorization of chancery cases might not be all inclusive. Before
the 1912 amendment to Article IV, Section 6, an appeal was allowed
in those cases in which there was no right to a jury trial. This pro-
cedure not only eliminated any possibility of confusion that would
have arisen in categorization had the appeals been limited to
"chancery cases," but it was also consistent with the fundamental
'"Those actions which the bills categorize as appealable in the equity
sense are actions in which the primary relief sought is:
(1) The construction or the enforcement of a trust, including
the enforcement or establishment of constructive or resulting
trusts.
(2) The establishment or enforcement of equitable estates
rising from the conversion of property,
(3) The foreclosure of mortgages and marshalling of liens in-
cluding statutory liens.
(4) The appointment, removal and control of trustees and re-
ceivers.
(5) The restraint of commission of torts.
(6) The reformation and cancellation of instruments in writ-
ing.
(7) The restraint of actions or judgments at law.
(8) The quieting of title to property, including the partition
thereof.
(9) The specific performance of contracts.
(10) Injunction, accounting, subrogation or interpleader.
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principles of justice as set out by Chief Justice Nichols, supra,
inasmuch as no appeal was allowed in those cases in which a right
to a jury trial was had below.
Ohio General Code Section 12224, long since laid to rest after
having been declared unconstitutional in Wagner v. Armstrong
may well serve as a pattern for future legislation establishing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals. Today, after
the 1944 amendment to Article IV, Section 6, the legislature has the
power to re-enact Ohio General Code Section 12224 and perhaps in
the not too distant future this statute granting an appeal in those
cases in which the right to a jury trial is denied below, may be dis-
covered and revitalized by the General Assembly so that con-
sistency and stability may be restored in the field of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals in Ohio.
William J. Lee
Absolute and Qualified Nuisance in Ohio
May a plaintiff, in Ohio, recover damages from a defendant
city for injuries which she received when a car in which she was
riding struck a tree at the edge of a street and in the right of way,
no negligence being shown on the part of the city?, May a plaintiff,
injured when she fell down a flight of stairs on a footbridge while
momentarily blinded by a sudden burst of smoke from defendant's
locomotive below the bridge, recover without alleging and proving
negligence on the part of the defendant railroad?2 Is a defendant
city liable for damages resulting to plaintiff's warehouse when a
water-main, weakened by the city's raising the level of the street
containing it, burst, flooding the warehouse, plaintiff basing its
action on nuisance, without a showing of negligence?3 The Supreme
Court of Ohio, in three recent decisions, answered these questions
in the negative, holding that, in none of these cases did defendant's
act constitute an absolute nuisance, for which there would be lia-
bility without a showing of negligence.
This entire field of nuisance in Ohio has been vague and in-
definite and the Supreme Court, particularly in the Taylor case, has
sought to bring some order to this branch of tort law by setting
up two classes of nuisance: those which are absolute or nuisances
per se for which liability attaches without fault, and those which
1Taylor v. Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724, 155 A.L.R. 44
(1944).
'Metzger v. Pennsylvania, 0. & D. Ry., 146 Ohio St. 406, 66 N.E.2d 203
(1946).
'Interstate Sash and Door Co. v. Cleveland, 148 Ohio St. 325, 74 N.E.2d
239 (1947)'.
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